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AbsTrAcT: The emergence of supply chain as a growing area of research has generated a renewed 
interest in theory and theory-making within the field of operations management. This interest is the 
result of the parallel advances in other areas like economics, sociology, and general management that 
have developed theoretical perspectives and tools relevant for the operations domain. Work in these 
areas has demonstrated the relevance of strategic action and organizational structure that are tradi-
tionally ignored in an operations framework. In this paper we propose a new theory through which ex-
isting research paradigms in the field of operations management may be reinterpreted and redirected. 
We call this theory the Theory of Entrepreneurial Policy Alignment (TEPA). The point of departure 
for the theory is the concept of the policy as the locus of institutional activity. The TEPA defines the 
policy as the fundamental unit of economic analysis and the strategic lever of entrepreneurial action. 
Analysis of policy – as opposed to the individual choice or the transaction cost – permits the examina-
tion of economic activity, which draws attention to the Schumpeterian dynamics of competing supply 
chains operating in environments far from equilibrium. This theoretical innovation marks the theory 
as distinct from others on order and can be seen as a movement through transaction cost economics. 
The TEPA recognizes the consequential nature of operations and incorporates policy considerations to 
arrive at a newer institutional economics. In this paper, we motivate the argument for developing such 
a theory, present its basic features and provide an example of how TEPA may be applied to a decision 
to offshore a manufacturing production facility. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
It is widely acknowledged that operations manage-
ment has traditionally lacked sound theory that is 
consistent, revealing and useful at the meso and 
micro levels of economic activity (Swamidass and 
Newell, 1987; Anderson et al., 1989; Flynn et al., 1990). 
Research in operations management has developed 
briskly for decades without an organic theory to 
link its discoveries to a broader interpretation of 
economic activity. There have been recent contribu-
tions to the theoretical discussion that rely upon and 
augment microeconomic theory (Schmenner and 
Swink, 1998) as well as some compelling work that 
addresses organizational design and its influence 
on operational outcomes (Ruffini et al., 2000; Miles 
and Snow, 2007). Barney (1986) states that “the im-
plications of Schumpeterian competition for norma-
tive theories of strategy remain largely unexplored,” 
and Porter (1981) identified research that develops “a 
model of competitive interaction among multibusi-
ness firms with business units in partly overlapping 
markets” as “an intriguing frontier.” But work that 
contributes to a theoretical foundation in operations 
management – a microfoundation that comfortably 
accommodates the domain of entrepreneurial eco-
nomic activity – has been conspicuously absent.
Theoretical orientations are critical because without 
them there is a tendency for the field to drift without 
obvious direction, devolving into a set of loosely as-
sociated techniques. Theory construction is helpful 
in any science because it gives practical researchers 
a common framework for discussion and a set of 
building blocks with which to develop specific re-
search programs.  Operations management is, at its 
root, an economic discipline, but the connections be-
tween its practice, as well as the research devoted to 
analyze or improve its practice, and prevailing eco-
nomic theory are tenuous at best. Neoclassical eco-
nomic theory, as a theory of individual choice, has 
famously experienced difficulty in reconciling the 
behavior and performance of economic institutions. 
New developments in the area would be supported 
if such a theoretical framework could be developed
Part of the challenge of linking the research practice 
of operations management to the abstract theory of 
professional economics is what might be called the 
“embarrassment of the firm”: the failure of economic 
theory to plausibly account for the obvious large-
scale organization of economic life into competing 
and imperatively structured institutions. Among 
the most successful and promising approaches to 
handle the problem of organization and coordina-
tion in economic life are the various examples of in-
stitutional economics. Of these, the Transaction Cost 
Economics perspective (TCE) of Oliver Williamson, 
with its natural fit with mainstream economic theo-
ry and its tight theoretical structure, has been more 
successful than most. But TCE helps us to answer 
questions that are not the most central from an op-
erations perspective. TCE helps to develop think-
ing about when and where the primary institutions 
of capitalism – the operations themselves – will 
emerge, but it has little to say about how optimal lo-
gistical arrangements or production and inventory 
policies within those operations will contribute to 
success or failure of any given operational system. 
This incapacity of the current institutional econom-
ics is no accident; rather it is the direct result of the 
theory’s point of departure and core assumptions 
which it borrows from mainstream economics. In 
the place of a theory of the governance of transac-
tions, operations management requires a theory of 
policy performance and policy alignment. In place 
of a theory of individual choice, operations manage-
ment requires a theory of efficient administration. 
This failure of TCE to account for the deliberate and 
scientific management of operations is analogous to 
the “embarrassment of the firm” that plagues neo-
classical economics. 
2. LITeRaTURe ReVIew
Concern for theory development within operations 
and supply chain management has been episodic 
but persistent over time. Within the last three de-
cades Swamidass and Newell (1987), Schmenner and 
Swink (1998) and Miles and Snow (2007) have all ad-
dressed the state of theory development within op-
erations or supply chain management and have pre-
scribed both new and old ideas to advance research 
and theory. 
At the same time Schmenner and Swink (1998) were 
calling for contributions to operations management 
theory while positing their own Wacker (1998) was 
discussing the definition of theory and the implica-
tions of such a definition for theory-building in op-
erations management. Wacker (1998) concluded that 
theory-building had not developed evenly across 
methodological domains and provided recommen-
dations for increasing theoretical abstraction to as-
sist in broader theory development in the field. 
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Work in operations and supply chain management 
theory development over the last decade has built 
largely upon contributions from the past. Gupta 
and Boyd (2008) echo the argument of Schmenner 
and Swink (1998) from a decade earlier that the 
Theory of Constraints (TOC) is a general theory 
for operations management and Seuring (2009) de-
velops supply chain design strategies based upon 
Schmenner and Swink’s (1998) theory of swift, even 
flow. Größler et al. (2008) discuss the usefulness of 
systems dynamics as a structural theory and sys-
tem dynamic models as content theories for opera-
tions management through a literature review and 
illustrative examples from operations management. 
Organizational and management theorists such as 
Ketchen and Hult (2007a, 2007b) describe how or-
ganization theory may be used to advance research 
in supply chain management and Cho and Barrow 
(2009) describe a method for predicting collabora-
tion strategies in supply chains based upon stake-
holder theory. Chen and Paulraj (2004) analyze 400 
articles across multiple disciplines to develop sup-
ply chain management constructs in order to “pave 
the way for theory-building” in supply chain man-
agement but make no connections between sup-
ply chain and economic theory. Williamson (2008) 
himself describes the linkage between transaction 
cost economics and supply chain management and 
numerous others have also praised its usefulness to 
include Grover and Malhotra (2003) who introduce 
a measurement model for transaction costs and de-
scribe how it might be used for research in opera-
tions and supply chain management. 
Recently, Singhal and Singhal (2012) have stated that 
although operations and supply chain management 
have progressed steadily as research fields over the 
last 60 years there remain opportunities to advance 
to include theory development. What has been re-
vealed over the last three decades and summarized 
recently by Singhal and Singhal (2012) is that there 
is agreement within the operations supply chain 
management research community that more can 
and should be done in terms of theory development. 
What is missing is any new discussion or change 
in the model of the basic economic environment 
which would therefore change the way in which the 
field thinks about its work. None of the work in op-
erations or supply chain theory has challenged the 
fundamental shortcomings of prevailing economic 
theory nor has it offered an alternative.  
An examination of some of the most popular text-
books in operations and supply chain management 
serves to highlight the lack of connection between 
economics – be it of the neoclassical or transaction 
cost variety – while in some cases reinforcing its 
commitment to scientific management (see Table 1). 
What is revealed by an examination of these text-
books is that the theoretic or foundational point of 
departure – or philosophical starting point – for the 
field of operations and supply chain management 
tends to be business strategy.  The observation that 
the point of departure for operations and supply 
chain management is business strategy is an impor-
tant one because strategy – in particular, the ideas of 
Porter (1980) – assumes a Schumpeterian economic 
view in which the entrepreneur, or entrepreneurial 
function, is dominant and where markets function 
not in equilibrium but in a state of disequilibrium 
which allows for strategy and opportunities to com-
pete on such things as operations and structuring 
your operations and supply chains to outperform 
compet itors.
Yoho, K. D., Simmons, S. J.: The Theory of Entrepreneurial Policy Alignment: A Newer Institutional Economics
ISSN: 1984-3046 • Journal of Operations and Supply Chain Management Volume 5 Number 2 pp 26 - 3929
place in the context of complicated supply chains of 
interrelated operations and a free enterprise system. 
The first makes operations management the natural 
place to situate the theory and the second connects 
the field to the broader tradition of economic theory 
and rational action.
3. The FIRsT sTep: ReCOgNIzINg 
eCONOmIC INsTITUTIONs aND 
TRaNsaCTION COsTs
A first step toward a solid theory of economic insti-
tutions was the Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) 
approach developed by Oliver E. Williamson built 
upon the work of his predecessor Ronald H. Coase 
and grounded in the institutional economics of John 
R. Commons (Coase,1937; Commons, 1931; William-
son, 1981a, 1985, 2000). In “The Nature of the Firm,” 
Coase (1937) developed the idea that the firm exists 
because transactions are not costless. Make or buy 
decisions, according to Coase, are determined based 
on how difficult it is to discern prices in the market 
and the degree of difficulty that arises during the 
course of a particular transaction. The more difficult 
it is to discover the price of a good, or conduct the 
transaction to legally secure it, the more likely the 
purchase will be governed by a hierarchy such as a 
firm rather than a market. Moreover, by relying on 
the Marshallian idea of the margin, Coase stated that 
the firm will be indifferent to how transactions are 
organized as the “costs of organizing an extra trans-
action within the firm become equal to the costs of 
carrying out the same transaction by means of an 
Table 1 – some popular operations and supply chain management texts and their corresponding foundational point of departure 
or philosophical starting point
Year 
Published Author(s) Title
Theoretic Foundational Point of 
Departure or Philosophical 
Starting Point
2011
Anupindi, R., Chopra, S., Deshmukh, S., 
Mieghem, J., & Zemel, E.
Managing Business Process Flows (3rd Ed.) Business Strategy
2012 Bowersox,D., Closs, D., & Cooper, M. Supply Chain Logistics Management (4th Ed.) Business Strategy
2012 Cachon, G. & Terwiesch, C. Matching Supply with Demand (3rd Ed.) Business Strategy
2012 Chopra, S. & Meindl, P. 
Supply Chain Management: Strategy, Planning and 
Operation (5th Ed.)
Business Strategy
2011 Hopp, W. & Spearman, M. Factory Physics (3rd Ed.)
Business Strategy with an emphasis 
on scientific management
2010 Jacobs, F., Chase, R., & Aquilano, N. Operations and Supply Management (13th Ed.) Business Strategy
2008
Simchi-Levi, D., Kaminsky, P., & Simchi-
Levi, E.
Designing & Managing the Supply Chain (3rd Ed.) Business Strategy
We propose a new point of departure and a new set 
of assumptions to underlie a “newer institutional 
economics” that conforms better to ongoing practice 
in operations management and therefore promises 
to be of more direct use than existing institutional 
theories. We posit that a good theory for operations 
management would accomplish four ends. First, it 
will open up intellectual space and allow consid-
eration of new ideas and modes of inquiry from 
a common frame of reference. Second, it will pro-
vide an opportunity to reexamine familiar concepts 
through a new lens in a manner that is systematic 
and disciplined. Third, it will be flexible with re-
spect to its level of abstraction or levels of analysis. 
The concepts, as well as the relationships among 
them, will be internally consistent but also robust so 
that both gross and finite economic activities may be 
examined from the same vantage. Fourth, and most 
importantly, a good theory in operations manage-
ment should allow an investigator to ask questions 
whose answers are interesting and useful, and for 
which the researcher has a readily deployable set of 
tools to begin.
We suggest that the following Theory of Entrepre-
neurial Policy Alignment (TEPA) has all of these fea-
tures and can be supported with concrete examples 
of research design drawn from proven methods in 
operations management. The Theory of Entrepre-
neurial Policy Alignment is not a set of hypotheses 
or a heuristic paradigm, but rather an integrated 
middle range theory of economic life which takes for 
granted that most interesting economic activity takes 
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exchange in the open market or the costs of organiz-
ing in another firm” (Coase, 1937). Williamson fur-
ther developed transaction cost economics by “mov-
ing beyond the agency theory tradition of ex ante 
incentive alignment” to the “ex post stage of the con-
tract” that aligns transaction types with appropri-
ate governance structures, and where all incentives 
are ultimately shaped (Williamson, 2000). William-
son’s contributions emphasized the different forms 
of governance structures – markets or firms – that 
would arise under different market conditions. For 
example, the degree to which assets are redeploy-
able and contracts are long-term or incomplete has a 
direct influence on the type of governance structure 
that will render the most efficient outcome (Riordan 
and Williamson, 1985; Williamson, 2000, 2002). Asset 
specificity (Doeringer and Piore, 1971) has become 
an important construct and is useful for describing 
and predicting how firms arrive at a decision to ei-
ther make or buy. When there is a high degree of as-
set specific city then those assets will likely be gov-
erned by a hierarchy such as a firm. Transaction cost 
economics has moved economic thinking forward in 
several ways but three are important for the devel-
opment of a Theory of Entrepreneurial Policy Align-
ment. First, TCE focused attention on the institution 
rather than the spontaneous coordination of rational 
individuals as the basic unit of economic analysis. 
Second, it indicated that different empirical contexts 
require different economic institutions; markets are 
efficient for transactions that are simple, complete 
and short-term while firms are efficient when con-
tracts are relatively complex and incomplete over 
long time horizons (Williamson, 2000). Third, TCE 
emphasized the need to look at more than one firm 
at a time, and to consider the nature of inter-firm 
relationships as well as transactions among them. 
This has been true of the TCE approach from the 
beginning. According to Coase (1998), “[w]e cannot 
confine our analysis to a single firm,” instead “[w]
hat we are dealing with is a complex interrelated 
structure.”
However, transaction cost economics is still suscep-
tible to the same critiques of the optimistic, utopian 
neoclassical constructions of economic equilibrium 
characteristic of Walras (1954), Pareto (1971), Arrow 
and Debreu (1954), and Debreu (1959). It is a well-
known vulnerability of equilibrium economics that 
it lacks correspondence with the observed data, and 
such endeavors have been pejoratively referred to by 
Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen as “pure mathematical 
exercises” (Georgescu-Roegen, 1966). Because Coase 
and Williamson take equilibrium as the natural state 
of economic activity they are restricted to the study 
of governance structures and inter-firm boundar-
ies. Additionally, they cannot directly model indus-
trial dynamics, which has been an important con-
tribution of the operations management discipline 
since the ground-breaking work of Jay Forrester 
(1958, 1961). Observation of transaction costs at the 
boundary of the firm ignores day-to-day, inter-firm 
operational dynamics. Indeed, any consideration of 
inter-firm dynamics may be dispensed with entirely 
by invoking the neoclassical notion of equilibrium 
which considers day-to-day operations to be either 
a nondescript “production function” (Samuelson, 
1962), as static, or trivial in the face of the histori-
cal long-run. Although Williamson (1999) has stated 
that TCE is not static, the use of terms such as ex 
ante and ex post in its theoretical development be-
tray his defense, and instead explicitly describe ac-
tivity that comes before and after a decision made at 
a point in time. But operations occur in medius res; 
they are ongoing, constant and have no clear begin-
ning, middle or end.
4 The NexT sTep: eNTRepReNeURIaL 
pOLICy aLIgNmeNT
The Theory of Entrepreneurial Policy Alignment 
(TEPA) is an institutional theory of economics.
Building on the work of John R. Commons, Ronald 
H. Coase and Oliver E. Williamson, TEPA incorpo-
rates theoretical, empirical and computational ad-
vances that allow us to better understand the con-
sequences of policy on the operations and success of 
the firm. Our theory is one of the middle range, and 
a central feature is the role of the entrepreneur as the 
locus of strategic action in a capitalist economy. Fun-
damental assumptions regarding the natural state 
of the economy, the origin of economic institutions, 
the importance of strategy and entrepreneurship, 
the basic unit of strategic analysis, and the intel-
lectual product of the theory itself that differentiate 
TEPA from neoclassical economics and transaction 
cost economics will be explicated in order to render 
a theory that is useful (see Table 2).
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Table 1 – some popular operations and supply chain management texts and their corresponding foundational point of departure 







Level of the Theory Unified Middle Range Middle Range
Natural State of Economy Equilibrium Equilibrium Disequilibrium
Origin of Economic Institutions Unknown Emergent Entrepreneurial Activity
Strategy and Entrepreneurship Trivial Auxiliary Central
Basic Unit of Strategic Analysis Individual Choices Firm Boundaries Supply Chain Dynamics
Intellectual Product Price Governance Structure Strategic Plan
fair game; equilibrium is a theory of fair games. We 
agree with Williamson (1999) that “saying dynamics 
is easy, doing dynamics is hard.” The hardest part 
of putting a handle on dynamics is maintaining the 
comforting fiction of equilibrium. We dispense with 
any notion of it entirely by adopting a middle range 
approach to our theory.
A persistent and pernicious conceit running through 
neoclassical economics is the excessive focus on 
long-run behavior while dismissing the short-run. 
Operations management, in particular, should take 
issue with the neoclassical tradition of dismissing 
short-run activity because operations management 
is, if nothing else, concerned with specific outcomes 
that obtain over short time horizons. Attention to 
the short-run entails an historical perspective – we 
assume that if events did not unfold in the precise 
way and sequence that they did that a very different 
outcome would result. Transaction cost economics 
places no emphasis on the implications of short-run 
competition. While long-run outcomes of economic 
activity are academically interesting, institutions 
and firms compete over the short-run. As Keynes 
(1923) has so famously stated:
In the long run we are all dead. Economists set 
themselves too easy, too useless a task if in tem-
pestuous seasons they can only tell us that when 
the storm is long past the ocean is flat again.
Transaction cost economics does little to address this 
failing of neoclassical economics. Williamson’s debt 
to John R. Commons for providing the notion of the 
exchange to better understand transactions is well 
satisfied (Williamson, 1975, 1981a,b, 1985, 1996, 1999, 
2000, 2002). But whatever may be Williamson’s intel-
lectual kinship to Commons he did not inherit the 
largest part of his estate: the historical perspective 
4.1   sampLe DemOgRaphIC pROFILe
Our is a modest proposal. Rather than attempt a 
unified, “theory of everything” which is so common 
among the economic and social sciences, we propose 
a Mertonian theory of the middle range – one whose 
value and usefulness is determined through its cor-
respondence to the observed data, and its utility with 
respect to allowing us to discern problems in new 
ways and posit new questions (Merton, 1957). Our 
middle range theory allows us to actually observe 
specific cases and model them with a great degree 
of specificity, something that Williamson (1999) has 
previously called for. We are not developing theory 
so that we may simply see the world differently but 
rather to answer questions that previously we did 
not even know to ask. We are indebted to transac-
tion cost economics for its emphasis on the interde-
pendence of firms in an industrial sector, particular-
ly with respect to the make-buy decision. However, 
more is required if we are to move toward providing 
an explanatory basis for concrete industrial settings, 
and a way to determine whether policies are aligned 
or misaligned. Our contribution is to provide a more 
fully dynamic construction of economic activity.
 
4.2 NaTURaL sTaTe OF The eCONOmy
There are two critical assumptions we make with re-
spect to economic activity: history is of consequence 
and that though there are equilibrating tendencies 
in economic activity they are never realized and dis-
equilibrium is the norm rather than the exception. 
We assume the natural state of the economy to be 
far from equilibrium. Assuming that the economy 
is dynamic, not static, is fundamental for allowing 
the possibility of strategy and strategic action. Stra-
tegic action relies on disequilibrium, disruption, and 
asymmetry to function (Jacobson, 1992). We recog-
nize that there is no optimal economic strategy in a 
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on economic development. The historical perspec-
tive is based upon the principle that things could 
be otherwise. History respects the passing of time 
and the sequence of events as being consequential. 
Equilibrium does not. Williamson recasts Commons 
as a transaction cost economist but Commons had 
intellectual roots, grafted through his mentor, Rich-
ard T. Ely, in the German historical school charac-
terized by List (1966) and Schmoller (1931) as well 
as the English Historical School characterized by 
Toynbee (1884) and Ashley (1897). Commons was 
interested in the transaction as a vehicle for histori-
cal insight rather than as a way of generalizing a 
theory of equilibrium. One can imagine that Com-
mons would not recognize himself in Williamson’s 
work. If doing dynamics is hard, doing dynamics 
historically is even harder. We require a method of 
representing economic activity in historical time, 
this requires radical simplification. One approach 
would be to construct simulation models that allow 
us to render the operational environment in a way 
that is explicit and concrete. We would then be able 
to observe possible outcomes over the short-run and 
better understand the operational consequences of 
strategic decisions.
 
4.3  The ORIgIN OF eCONOmIC 
INsTITUTIONs
Neoclassical economics cannot account for the or-
ganization of capital into persistent, future-oriented 
organizations. However, modern capitalism is com-
posed primarily of hierarchies that manifest in the 
form of firms (Burnham, 1941). Transaction cost eco-
nomics regards institutions as emergent; they arise 
because of the need to subject complete, long-term 
transactions to a structured hierarchy that results in 
making them more efficient (Williamson, 2002). En-
trepreneurial policy alignment observes institutions 
as the product of past entrepreneurial activity; in-
stitutions are the result of deliberate entrepreneurial 
policy and artifacts of a particular strategic legacy. 
The fact that a particular organizational form is ef-
ficient or inefficient may have been driven by either 
a desire for efficiency –  such as reducing transac-
tion costs (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985) – or by a 
desire for advantage (Porter, 1980; Wernerfelt, 1984; 
Barney,
1991) – but it may also be the result of a poor de-
cision. No normative expectations are assigned to 
institutions – they are recognized simply as the out-
growth of a deliberate policy put into place by an en-
trepreneur at some earlier point in time. One could 
say that capitalism, like Churchill said of democra-
cy, is the worst form of economic system, except for 
all those other forms that have been tried from time 
to time. 
There are forebears of our ideas in Nelson and Win-
ter (2002) with respect to their definition and consid-
eration of routines, as well as Coriat and Dosi (1998) 
who introduce the notion of organizational forms as 
a way to describe clusters of routines. But the evo-
lutionary explanations of economic activity treat 
routines almost the way in which Dawkins (1978) 
describes “memes” which bring to mind fantasies 
of a Vast Active Living Intelligence System (Dick, 
1987), or Gaia (Lovelock, 1979; Tielhard de Chardin, 
2004) that acts through rational agents. Consider 
three conceptual challenges to such a theory. The 
first challenge is the fact that environments change 
quickly, and when the rate of change in the environ-
ment is greater than the rate of selection, trait-selec-
tion mechanisms become less significant. The second 
is that economic environments are often small rela-
tive to the number of members of the population. An 
economic environment, or market, is defined by the 
countable number of members who participate in it. 
When that countable number is small it is difficult to 
have a modular selection process – whole systems 
are not selected out. Efficient evolution requires 
large numbers. Third, the number of traits in any 
given environment may be large relative to the num-
ber of members of the population. If there are more 
traits than members of the population it is difficult 
to determine which among them matter with respect 
to survival. For these reasons we do not subscribe to 
any emergent theory of the firm or economic insti-
tutions based on routines. Instead, we subscribe to 
a theory where entrepreneurs take deliberative ac-
tion and create firms through policy. It is not that 
we consider feedback unimportant but rather that 
we are agnostic with respect to matters of selection. 
Entrepreneurs make policy but not in the manner of 
their choosing. Rather than taking a stand on the ap-
propriate biological metaphor to employ we prefer 
to model industrial systems directly.
A Policy is Not a Routine. A routine is an emergent 
property – a non-intentional element. No individual 
is essential for a routine to occur, manifest or func-
tion. A routine is implicit. A person does not have 
to know if they are in a routine. A policy is explicit 
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so that even if it is not articulated by management it 
possesses attributes and featues so that it could be. 
Regardless of how latent it may be a policy is always 
recognized when it has been violated. If a person is 
not correctly following a policy they will know it be-
cause the operational system will discipline them or 
give them feedback.
A policy is a deliberative guideline that may be as 
general as a principle or as specific as a rule. A pol-
icy cuts across the strategic, tactical and operational 
levels of the firm. The firm itself is a policy decision 
made by the entrepreneur. Policies are different from 
routines in that we are always actively aligning them 
through a process we typically refer to as manage-
ment. The function and prerogative of management 
is to take routines, align them, discipline them and 
make them policy. Active management takes routines 
and makes them explicit so that they may become 
policy, much like Frederick Taylor’s famous example 
of Schmidt the pig iron handler (Taylor, 1911).
 
5. ImpORTaNCe OF eNTRepReNeURshIp 
aND sTRaTegy
At the root of our theory is the assumption that there 
are two types of rational economic actors that consti-
tute mature capitalism: entrepreneurial and normal. 
The distinction between the two is a choice of pursu-
ing existent cash flows or creating new ones (Brad-
ford and Osborne, 1976). Entrepreneurial actors are 
what Weber has called autocephalous – they are “in-
dependent heads” possessing not only autonomy but 
also the authority to compel others to behave (Weber, 
1964). The entrepreneur, or the entrepreneurial func-
tion, is the visible hand (Chandler Jr., 1977) – both the 
creative and destructive force – that drives capitalist 
economies (Schumpeter, 1947, 1961).
Modern industrial states require entrepreneurs who 
are able to accumulate and aggregate surplus capi-
tal in quantities sufficient to pursue large industrial 
projects such as railroads, mining, and automotive 
manufacturing (Chandler Jr., 1977; Johnson, 1991). 
It has been observed that capital must necessarily be 
accumulated into the hands of a few strategic eco-
nomic actors for modern economies to thrive. Behold 
any economy made up entirely of entrepreneurs and 
you will find an economy that is not industrialized – 
a bazaar of fruit stalls, textile vendors and fishmon-
gers (Soto, 2000).
If one chooses the path of an entrepreneurial actor 
they enter the realm of strategic action where strate-
gic opportunities are possible. The entrepreneur has 
real assets that they play with – not just claims on 
assets; they have operations and the ability to create 
policies that reorganize those operations. Entrepre-
neurs are the locus of strategic action within a spe-
cific economic domain – be it a market, a firm or a 
collection of institutions engaged in exchange – and 
they set the policies that others are compelled to fol-
low. The entrepreneur is vested with the authority to 
direct and reorganize existing institutional and eco-
nomic structures by virtue of their accumulated sur-
plus and inheritance of supply. Entrepreneurs struc-
ture organizations and determine their boundaries.
Within hierarchical organizations, such as a firm, we 
find normal actors who are reduced to functional 
rather than substantive rationality – they may pur-
sue adaptive behavior that is confined to what is 
observable and known about the economic environ-
ment but they may not unilaterally behave or act ra-
tionally because they do not have the freedom or au-
tonomy to arrange the rules under which their own 
economic activity takes place. Instead, normal actors 
follow and enforce the entrepreneur’s policy. Nor-
mal actors conform to an existing range of economic 
activity and seek existing cash flows bestowed by 
entrepreneurs. A choice to pursue the path of a nor-
mal economic actor is to pursue functional action 
with functional opportunities that are at most adap-
tive but not ultimately innovative. 
Entrepreneurial actors are strategic foremost in that 
their actions are calculated and deliberate. The en-
trepreneur has access to both substantive and func-
tional rationality whereby they may both perceive 
and act rationally due to their privilege of unilateral 
and strategic action; they are two dimensional in 
the Marcusean sense (Marcuse, 1964). Our notion of 
strategic action is different from that of TCE which 
defines it as either adaptive, in a Hayekian sense of 
expanding within the existing range of practice, or 
as economizing to eliminate waste and inefficiency 
(Williamson, 1991). Our view of strategic action is 
Schumpeterian in that it is both creative and innova-
tive. The strategic action of an entrepreneur is a re-
sponse to change that is “outside the existing range 
of practice” and is “an essential part of the historical 
process” (Schumpeter, 1947).
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5.1 NORmaL VeRsUs sTRaTegIC aCTION
There are three things that distinguish strategic 
from normal action: a lack of risk aversion, genius 
and accumulated surplus. Wilken (1979) provides 
a discussion of the relationship between entre-
preneurship and risk, and recently McMullen and 
Shepherd (2006) have addressed how entrepreneurs 
perceive and bear risk as well as uncertainty. How-
ever, risk aversion is a subject that has been studied 
extensively and we will not give a full exposition of 
it here. We accept that varying degrees of risk avoid-
ance are present. It is traditional to ascribe entrepre-
neurship to some unique, creative genius. Either by 
some marvelous invention, astounding innovation 
or sheer force of charisma the hero shapes the world 
around them and structures history (Carlyle, 1840, 
1843; Epstein, 1926; Collins and Moore, 1964). We 
shall leave investigations of risk aversion and the 
cult of the hero to others. Instead, we shall confine 
our attention to what we believe is the most robust 
and readily observable source of entrepreneurship: 
the possession of wealth (Cooper and Dunkelberg, 
1986). It is the previous accumulation of surplus that 
is by far the most formidable characteristic of the en-
trepreneur in that it accords significant advantage to 
the possessor.
The previous accumulation of surplus endows the 
entrepreneur with the opportunity to pursue strate-
gic action, and to be creative with latitude and in-
tensity that normal actors can only imagine. Oppor-
tunity – or any path that leads to obvious economic 
advantage – is scarce in any given environment. The 
accumulation of surplus gives the entrepreneur ad-
vantage in pursuing opportunity by either affording 
him the economic strength to wrest it from another 
or by acting on the opportunity more quickly. The 
magnitude of the entrepreneur’s ability to reorga-
nize and restructure their economic environment is 
amplified in proportion to their accumulated sur-
plus – the greater their aggregation of surplus the 
greater their potential force. 
Capitalism is an ideal economic domain for entre-
preneurial action because it is the only way entre-
preneurs can engage in competitive, strategic activ-
ity with other entrepreneurs (Schumpeter, 1961). 
However, this is not to say that all entrepreneurs are 
created equal. There are entrepreneurs both large 
and small – just as there are manifold predatory 
creatures that roam the Serengeti Plain – and they 
are in an endless competition to accumulate greater 
and greater degrees of economic surplus in an arena 
that is characterized by unadorned competition; a 
state of capitalistic “nature red in tooth and claw” 
(Tennyson, 1998). 
The autocratic authority of the entrepreneur to reor-
ganize capital as they choose is what gives capital-
ism its character and organizational efficiency. The 
scope of autonomy possessed by normal actors is 
bounded within the firm by policy that is set by the 
entrepreneur. The scope of the entrepreneur’s au-
tonomy is bounded only by the magnitude of their 
accumulated surplus, their will to exercise it, and 
whatever prevailing limits that may be prescribed 
and set by the state.
5.2  BasIC UNIT OF sTRaTegIC aNaLysIs
We define an institution as a collection of policies 
intentionally aligned to provide a good at the highest 
possible price with the lowest possible cost. An insti-
tution is an intentional structure – someone intended 
it to be that way and that someone is the entrepre-
neur. The institution is not an individual nor is it nec-
essarily a single organization or firm. The institution 
is defined simply as an operational system that is di-
mensionalized at the level of competition. This defi-
nition of the institution is a distinguishing feature of 
our theory. Consider two competing supply chains 
that produce a similar good (see Figure 1).





Supply  Chain A
Supply  Chain B
Institutional and transaction cost economics would 
begin and end with an examination of the nature of 
the transactions between particular suppliers, pro-
duction facilities, distribution centers and retailers 
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as well as the degree of asset specificity. However, 
a policy-based approach would examine the inter-
relationship of the policies that structure the dy-
namics of the entire supply chain. The production 
facilities in Supply Chain A are not competing with 
the production facilities in Supply Chain B. The 
entire supply chains of both A and B are competing 
against one another. Should the retailers of either 
supply chain fail or cease operation it is not just the 
distribution centers that will suffer but the entire 
chain of economic entities that support the retailer. 
If the production facilities in Supply Chain A close 
or move offshore the suppliers will not simply be 
able to effortlessly and immediately sell their goods 
to the production facilities in Supply Chain B. Dis-
ruptions in any part of the chain will reverberate 
and if the suppliers in Supply Chain A are able to 
stay in business at all it will be the result of one of 
two things: 1) the ability and willingness of the pro-
duction facilities in Supply Chain B to reorganize 
and take them in or, 2) their ability to exercise their 
entrepreneurial freedom to organize or produce 
something new and innovative. What makes our 
Theory of Entrepreneurial Policy Alignment dis-
tinctive is that we recognize the regular structure of 
productive environments, and turn our attention to 
chains – supply chains, value chains or commodity 
chains (Gereffi et al., 2005) – that are real, coherent 
entities that we define as a single institution. Here, 
an institution is comprised of whatever grouping 
of entities makes sense for evaluating competitive 
behavior and its outcomes.  
 
5.3  INTeLLeCTUaL pRODUCT
The chief intellectual product of our Theory of En-
trepreneurial Policy Alignment is a strategic plan. 
This is in contrast to analysis in TCE which produces 
a justification for a particular governance structure 
for transactions. It is also different from neoclassical 
economics which provides a rationale for assigning 
an equilibrium price and expectations of penalties 
for deviating from it.
Whether strategy is planned in detail or is emer-
gent (Mintzberg andWaters, 1985; Mintzberg and 
McHugh, 1985; Miles and Snow, 2003) we agree with 
Chandler Jr. (1962) that strategy is “the determina-
tion of the basic long-term goals and objectives of 
the enterprise and the adoption of courses of action 
and the allocation of resources necessary for carry-
ing out these goals.” Strategy is the conscious work 
of rational agents who shape the world rather than 
simply react to it. While Chandler has provided an 
idea of what strategy is we still need to understand 
how to deploy it. A strategic plan is a course of ac-
tion – it describes what is to be done to achieve a 
strategic objective and operations is chiefly about 
doing things. By focusing on policies and how they 
direct people to do things we can move forward with 
a theory that is useful for studying operations.
6 CONCLUsION
We have introduced the Theory of Entrepreneurial 
Policy Alignment (TEPA) that moves economic anal-
ysis beyond traditional neoclassical, transaction cost, 
and institutional economics. The TEPA opens a theo-
retical space for economic exploration that considers 
the operational aspects of institutional activity. In-
stitutions are defined as supply chains comprised of 
firms with a mutual economic interest. Two types of 
economic actors are identified: entrepreneurial and 
normal. The entrepreneur is identified as the key 
strategic actor in any economic context while the 
normal actor seeks out cash flows existent in the eco-
nomic domain that is configured by entrepreneurial 
activity. Entrepreneurs are interested in discovering 
the position in the supply chain that provides the 
greatest cash flow as well as understanding how a 
particular strategic decision will affect current and 
future cash flows. Both history and strategy are criti-
cal to understanding how economic activity evolves. 
Policies are the strategic levers of entrepreneurial ac-
tion, and they are the fundamental unit of economic 
activity. The notion of pure economic equilibrium is 
rejected and therefore allows for notions of competi-
tive asymmetry that makes strategic opportunity 
possible. Strategic frameworks such as those put 
forth by Schumpeter (1961), and later transliterated 
for the management community by Porter (1980), 
are all part of the furniture that constitutes the apart-
ment of entrepreneurial theory. 
The Theory of Entrepreneurial Policy Alignment is 
not methodologically deterministic and lends itself 
to multiple forms of investigation. We can imagine 
other researchers using interesting and substantive 
methods within the context of TEPA. Examples might 
include survey methods supported by active field 
work as well as modeling techniques that involve 
computer simulation. However, TEPA is fundamen-
tally empirical in that it is grounded in what John R. 
Commons called the “go and see” approach to re-
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search; models, cases, and hypotheses are grounded 
in thorough observation to ensure correspondence 
with ongoing or emerging economic activity.
If we wish to move beyond the arm-chair economics 
of the neoclassicists who are unable to provide man-
agement with any useful place to begin a serious in-
vestigation of operations beyond a “production func-
tion”, a bald and unsatisfying f(x), then we must con-
duct thorough empirical investigations of operations 
and describe and model them as they are – not as we 
would like them to be for purposes of our analysis. 
If we wish to move beyond governance structures, 
efficiency and neo-Hayekian adhocracy we require a 
newer institutional economics that considers advan-
tage in the context of an entire supply chain.
Researchers in management are struggling to un-
derstand why and how supply chains are structured 
and function as they do. In the process, they are 
turning to the most readily available tools that are 
applicable to the task, those being the middle range 
theories of transaction cost economics, consideration 
of strategy through some notion of competitive ad-
vantage, and the resource-based view of the firm. 
However, because TCE implicitly relies on equi-
librium theory it cannot seriously interact with the 
concepts of strategy or advantage which, in impor-
tant ways, contradict it. McIvor (2009) has recently 
shown that depending upon the potential for oppor-
tunism and the firm’s resource position (“strong” 
versus “weak”) transaction cost economics and the 
resource-based view of the firm will prescribe con-
tradictory decisions with respect to outsourcing. 
Because our theory is one of the middle range, and 
does not rely on a concept of equilibrium, but rather 
accepts that there are equilibrating tendencies in 
economic activity and that the preponderance of this 
activity is far from equilibrium, it is compatible with 
other management theories that are current or may 
emerge.  The theory opens up methodological space 
for simulation analysis as well as field studies that 
utilize process or ethnographic analyses. Simulation 
analyses that focus on transient states – and not just 
steady-state equilibrium – would reveal the implica-
tions of different operational management policies 
on outcome variables of interest such as inventory, 
product stockouts or backorders, and financial prof-
itability over time.  Outcomes that affect the firm in 
the short-run often have profound determining ef-
fects – whether it survives or goes bankrupt – and 
simulation that looks specifically at the time series 
of variables of interest could provide insight to man-
agers with respect to the short-run risk associated 
with different policy decisions. TEPA allows opera-
tions and supply chain management to understand, 
and communicate about, economic activity in terms 
of policies that are managerial in nature, and to dis-
pense with the notions that operations are reducible 
to a “production function” and that such activity 
takes place in stable equilibrium. TEPA provides 
a theoretical microfoundation for operations and 
supply chain management that comfortably accom-
modates the domain of entrepreneurial economic 
activity that has been conspicuously absent in other 
economic and management theories. As we stated 
earlier, theoretical orientations are critical because 
without them there is a tendency for the field to drift 
without obvious direction, devolving into a set of 
loosely associated techniques.
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